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"California Dreamin' ":
May a State Limit Its Welfare Benefits
Based on Length of Residency?
by Jay. E. Grenig

Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, 1103 West Wisconsin
Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233;
(414) 288-377.

ED]ITOR9 S NOTE:
The Supreme Court is considering
another case involving California's
payment of benefits under its Aid to
Families with Dependent Children
program. See Anderson and Gould
v. Edwards at page 197 for the case
analysis.

tfSSUE
May a state temporarily limit a new
resident's welfare benefits to the
level of benefits the resident
received, or would have received, if
that person were still living in his or
her former state of residence?

ing states have the flexibility to set
the standard of need and the level
of benefits.
On December 1, 1992, California
began a five-year experimental
project known as the Assistance
Payments Demonstration Project
(the "Demonstration Project").
Among other things, the Demonstration Project limits the amount of
AFDC benefits available to an
applicant who has not resided in
California for a period of at least
one year (the "one-year residency
requirement" or the "residency
requirement"). Specifically, the
Demonstration Project's one-year
residency requirement provides that

Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC") is a welfare
program created in 1935 by the
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
601-687 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
AFDC benefits are financed jointly
by the federal government and participating states. The program is
administered by each participating
state under a plan drafted by the
state and approved by the United
States Secretary of Health and
Human Services. Subject to certain
limitations in federal law, participat-

at~a
Glance
In 1992 California
enacted a statute providing that new residents
applying for Aid to
Families with Dependent
Children would receive
the level of benefits they
had received, or would
have received, in their
home states for the first

(Continued on page 202)

year of their California
residency. In this case,
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during the first year of California
residency, a new resident seeking
AFDC benefits is eligible only for the
level of benefits that he or she
received, or would have received,
before moving to the State.
The California Legislature enacted
the one-year residency requirement
as a means of reducing welfare
expenditures. There is also some
evidence that the one-year residency requirement was enacted to
discourage indigent families from
moving to California. For example,
the California Department of
Finance estimated that the residency requirement would save $8.4 million in the State's 1992-93 fiscal year
and $22.5 million in its 1993-94
fiscal year.
Deshawn Green and her two
children moved from Louisiana to
California in 1992. At that time, the
full monthly California AFDC grant
for a family of three was $624.
Under California's one-year residency requirement for AFDC benefits,
Green and her family would receive
only $190 a month during their first
year of California residency, i.e., the
amount the family would have
received if they had remained in
Louisiana.
Debby Venturella came to California
from Oklahoma in 1992. At the
time Venturella relocated, she had
one child and was pregnant with
another but was not receiving AFDC
benefits. Under California's one-year
residency requirement, Venturella
and her two children would receive
$341 a month in AFDC benefits during their first year of California residency, i.e., the Oklahoma level of
AFDC benefits for a family of three.
Diana Bertollt moved to California
from Colorado. She had one child
and, for the family's first year of
California residency, would receive
$280 a month in AFDC beneifts -
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The district court determined that
California's one-year residency
requirement penalizes interstate
migration and implicates the Equal
Protection Clause. Applying strict
scrutiny, the court concluded that
California had not established a
compelling interest for the residency
requirement, notwithstanding the
State's legitimate interest in conserving its limited pool of welfare funds.
The court also noted that a state
may not favor established residents
over new residents based on the
view that the state should take care
of its own first. The court then concluded that the Green Class had
demonstrated that its members
would suffer irreparable injury if the
State were allowed to implement the
residency requirement and, accordingly, enjoined its implementation.

the Colorado benefit level for a family of two -- not the full California
benefit level of $504.
These three individuals filed suit in
the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California on
behalf of themselves and the class of
California residents who had not
resided in the State for at least 12
consecutive months and who had
applied, or were going to apply, for
AFDC benefits after the effective
date of the one-year residency
requirement (the "Green Class" or
the "Class"). The Green Class
alleged that at least some of its
members had moved to California to
escape abusive domestic circumstances, not to seek higher welfare
grants. The Class further alleged that
it had suffered irreparable injury
because, under the one-year residency requirement, its members
would not receive the same AFDC
benefits that they would have
received if they had resided in
California for the preceding year.
The Class asked for a preliminary
injunction barring the State from
implementing its one-year residency
requirement.
The district court, after a hearing,
issued a preliminary injunction,
enjoining implementation of the
one-year residency requirement.
811 F.Supp. 516 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
The court found that the residency
requirement implicated the constitutional right to migrate which, under
Supreme Court precedent as interpreted by the district court, is
subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
(Under strict scrutiny, California is
required to advance a compelling
interest to be served by the one-year
residency requirement and also is
required to establish that the residency requirement is a narrowly
I tailored means to achieve its compelling interest.)

The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 26 F3d
95 (9th Cir. 1994). The case is now
before the Supreme Court, which
granted the petition of the California
officials for a writ of certiorari.
115 S. Ct. 306 (1994).

I

CASE ANALYSIS
This case calls on the Supreme
Court to revisit a 25-year line of
cases that began in 1969 with
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). In Shapiro, the Court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis and
struck down three statutes that prevented a newcomer from receiving
AFDC benefits or diability assistance
for the first 12 months of his or her
new residency. The Court explained
that such provisions discriminate
invidiously by creating two classes of
needy, bona fide residents that were
indistinguishable from each other
except that one class was composed
of needy persons who had resided in
the jurisdiction for more than a year
while the second class was composed
of needy persons who had not.

Issue No. 4

The Shapiro Court refused to accept
as a compelling interest for the oneyear waiting period that it would
deter the migration of poor people
into the affected jurisdictions,
declaring that such reasoning was
directly at odds with the constitutional right to move from state to
state. The Court also said that it was
irrelevant that a person migrating to
a particular state did so in search of
higher assistance payments or did so
for other reasons. On that point, the
Court concluded that a state had no
more right to deter a person from
moving there because of greater welfare assistance than it had to deter a
person who moved there because of
better educational opportunities.
The Court also rejected the defense
that the one-year ban on welfare
benefits merely took into account
the differential tax contributions
made by long- and short-term
residents. On that point, the Court
opined that such reasoning logically
permitted a state to bar new residents from schools, parks, and
libraries or deprive them of police
and fire protection. Finally, the
Court held that a state's concern for
its fiscal integrity, while legitimate,
was not compelling and, thus, could
not justify discrimination against
new residents.
The Supreme Court followed
Shapiro in MemorialHospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974), invalidating an Arizona
statute that required a year's residence in a county as a condition
of receiving nonemergency medical
care at county expense. See also
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972) (invalidating a one-year
residency requirement before a new
resident could vote).
In Maricopa County, the Court
1framed the issue as whether or not
Arizona's one-year residency
requirement on the provision of non-

emergency medical services penalized persons who had recently
migrated there. If there were such a
penalty, the Court, applying strict
scrutiny, observed that the requirement would be unconstitutional
unless supported by a compelling
governmental interest. The Court
went on to conclude that Arizona's
one-year denial of nonemergency
medical services penalized new residents in the same way and to the
same extent as the one-year denial
of the necessities of life in Shapiro
operated to penalize new residents
in those jurisdictions. In so holding,
the Court ruled the Arizona's interest in protecting its financial stability was not a compelling interest and,
hence, could not justify its discrimination against newcomers. The
Court observed that conservation of
the taxpayers' purse simply is not a
sufficient state interest to sustain a
durational residency requirement,
which, in effect, severely penalizes
an individual who chooses to exercise his or her right to move to
another state.
In three more recent cases, the
Supreme Court has expanded the
equality principle announced in
Shapiro. In Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55 (1982), the Court invalidated an Alaska statute that provided
for payments from oil revenues to all
residents but used length of residency as the basis for calculating the
size of the payments. In Hooper v.
Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S.
612(1985), the Court invalidated a
property tax exemption based on
residency before a specified date.
And, in State Attorney General of
New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
898 (1986), the Court invalidated
New York's veterans-preference provisions that limited benefits to veterans who had been state residents
prior to a specified date or who had
entered the military while a New
York State resident.

However, on at least one occasion,
the Supreme Court has upheld a
durational residency requirement.
In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393
(1975), the Court upheld Iowa's
one-year residency requirement for
filing for divorce. Distinguishing
Sosna from Shapiro, Maricopa
County, and Dunn, the Court noted
that a state's interest in regulating
domestic relations and protecting
its divorce decrees from collateral
attack was materially greater than
the budgetary and recordkeeping
interests advanced in the prior
cases.
In this case, California argues that
its one-year residency requirement
differs in material respects from the
statutes at issue in Shapiro and
MaricopaCounty. In this regard,
California seeks to distinguish
Shapiro and MaricopaCounty
from this case by stressing that a
new resident in those cases irretrievably lost his or her eligibility
for public assistance for a period of
time solely because of a move to a
new state.
California points out that no such
extreme consequence befalls a newcomer to its State. The State stresses repeatedly that no member of
the Green Class has lost the eligibility for public assistance that was
enjoyed in his or her home state.
According to the State, members of
the Class are limited, but only temporarily, to the level of AFDC benefits payable in their home states.
California asks the Court to determine if the relevant comparison for
constitutional purposes is between
newcomers to California and residents of other states or between
newcomers and existing California
residents in deciding whether or
not new residents suffer any detriment because of the residency
requirement. On this point, the district court held that the proper
(Continued on page 204)
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comparison for constitutional pur-

poses is between California residents
of less than one year and all other
California residents.
If the Court accepts California's
position and determines that the relevant comparison is between
new California residents and
nonresidents, the Court could
conclude that newcomers to
California have not sustained any
detriment to their interests. In other
words, the Court could hold that
newcomers to California receive
AFDC benefits in the same amount
they received, or would have
received, in their home states.
The Green Class responds by arguing that the Court has made it clear
that the constitutionally-grounded
rights to migrate and to equal treatment do not permit significant distinctions between new and old residents based on the duration or
incipiency of residency. Relying on
Court cases that have held that the
relevant comparison in residency
cases is not between new residents
of a state and residents of other
states but between new residents

and existing residents of the same
state, the Class asserts California's
position is flawed. According to the
Green Class, the issue in this case is
whether or not California's one-year
residency requirement treats needy
newcomers to the State differently
than it treats other needy California
residents. To the Green Class the
answer is obvious - with respect to
AFDC benefits, California treats
recent and existing needy residents
differently to the detriment of the
former.
The Green Class also disagrees with
California's argument that the
Court's residency cases all considered statutes or administrative provisions that wholly eliminated,
rather than reduced, welfare benefits
to new state residents. Here, the
Class asserts that providing partial
benefits to new residents rather than
full benefits is a distinction without
a constitutional difference. In the
case of both full and partial reduction of welfare benefits based on
length of residency, the right to
migrate and the right to equal treatment are violated without serving any
compelling governmental interest.

SIGNIFICANCE
The 1994 mid-term elections suggest
that welfare reform is the political
watchword for the remainder of the
1990s. Accordingly, this case will
provide guidance as to what states
can and cannot do, consistent with
the Constitution, to control welfare
costs. More specifically, the Court
has the opportunity to determine if
its decision in Shapiro should be
applied to situations in which a state
does not deny benefits to a newcomer, but temporarily limits the
amount of benefits.
Should the Court apply the reasonable basis or rationality test to
California's one-year residency
requirement, as urged by the State,
instead of strict scrutiny, as urged by
the Green Class, California could
prevail since it is easier to advance a
legitimate or rational interest for a
law than it is to advance a compelling one. But, even if the Court
agrees with California as to the
appropriate test to be applied to its
one-year residency requirement, it
remains to be seen if the requirement actually advances a legitimate
interest. The Court could decide this
issue if the record is sufficiently
complete on this point, or it could
send the case back to the lower
courts to make this determination in
the first instance.

(Continued on page 205)
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Issue No. 4

ARGUMENTS
For Eloise Anderson, individually
and in her official capacity as
Director of the California Department of Social Services; California
Department of Social Services; and
Russell Gould, Director of the
California Department of Finance
(Counsel of Record: Theodore
Garelis, Deputy Attorney General of
the State of California; P.O. Box
944255, Sacramento, CA 942442550; (916) 445-0767):
1. California's one-year residency
requirement does not operate as a
penalty on migration because it does
not deny newcomers any assistance,
but simply denies temporarily an
increase in assistance.
2. Even if the statute operates as a
penalty on migration, the impact of
the penalty is remote and incidental.
3. California's interest in reducing
welfare costs is sufficient to justify
the use of a two-tier system of distributing benefits under its Aid to
Families with Dependent Children
program.
For Deshawn Green, Debby
Venturella, and Diana P. Bertollt, on
behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated (Counsel of
Record: Sarah E. Kurtz; Legal Aid
Society of San Mateo County; 298
Fuller Street, Redwood City, CA
94063; (415) 365-8411):
1. The right to interstate migration
has been long recognized as
essential.

American Bar Association

2. California's one-year residency
requirement deprives newly-arrived
residents of the ability to obtain
basic necessities of life, including
shelter, medical care, and clothing,
solely because the new residents
have recently exercised their right to
interstate migration.
3. The right of interstate migration
must be seen as ensuring new residents the same right to vital government benefits and privileges in the
states to which they migrate as are
enjoyed by other residents.

AMICUS IBRiEFs
In support of Eloise Anderson et al.
Joint brief of the States of
Minnesota, Florida, Hawaii, and
Pennsylvania (Counsel of Record:
Jocelyn F. Olson, Assistant Attorney
General of the State of Minnesota;
445 Minnesota Street, Suite 900,
St. Paul, MN 55101-2127;
(612) 296-7703);
Joint brief of the Mountain States
Legal Foundation, the Howard Jarvis
Taxpayers Association, and the
Alliance for America (Counsel of
Record: William Perry Pendley;
Mountain States Legal Foundation;
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300;
Denver CO 80264; (303) 861-0244);
Pacific Legal Foundation
(Counsel of Record: Deborah J.
La Fetra; Pacific Legal Foundation;
2151 River Plaza Drive, Suite 305,
Sacramento, CA 95833;
(916) 641-8888);
Joint brief of the Washington
Legal Foundation and various United
States representatives and California
legislators (Counsel of Record: David
A. Price; Washington Legal
Foundation; 2009 Massachusetts
Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036;
(202) 588-0302).

For Deshawn Green, Debby
Venturella, and Diana P. Bertolt,
on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated
The American Bar Association
(Counsel of Record: George E.
Bushnell, Jr., President, American
Bar Association; 750 North Lake
Shore Drive, Chicago, IL 60611;
(312) 988-5215);
Joint brief of Catholic Charities
U.S.A., National Council of
Churches in Christ in the U.S.A.,
and the American Jewish Congress
(Counsel of Record: Daniel Marcus;
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; 2445 M
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037;
(202) 663-6000);
Law Professors (Counsel of
Record: Jonathan D. Varat;
UCLA School of Law; 405 Hilgard
Avenue; Los Angeles, CA 90024;
(310) 825-1994);
National Welfare Rights and
Reform Union (Counsel of Record:
Timothy J. Casey; Center on
Welfare Policy and Law; 275 7th
Avenue; New York, NY 10001;
(212) 633-6967);
NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund and 18 other
organizations (Counsel of Record:
Martha F. Davis; NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund; 99
Hudson Street, 12th Floor, New
York, NY 10013; (212) 925-6635).
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